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INTRODUCTION 
For the better part of two decades, feminists have been questioning the 
usefulness of the law in advancing gender justice.1 Early feminist struggles, 
particularly those of what is commonly understood as second-wave 
feminism, focused on achieving formal equality and giving teeth to 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.2 The big cases are easily 
recognizable landmark changes to constitutional law.3 Common law has 
received comparatively less attention as a source of and, indeed, as a locus 
of gender justice. Professor Anita Bernstein’s book The Common Law Inside 
the Female Body makes a powerful argument that we need to consider. The 
common law is often derogatorily dismissed as “judge-made law” in the 
United States, possibly because we have come to believe (erroneously) that 
the province of lawmaking is that of the legislature alone and that judges 
ought to stick to interpreting and applying that which is legislated or 
 
 * Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. 
 1 See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 5 (1989). 
 2 ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 89–90 (2019). 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (finding exclusion of women from a state 
educational institution a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decriminalizing abortion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (finding preference 
for male executors of estates a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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recognized clearly as common law precedent. This is likely a peculiarity of 
the American legal tradition with its preoccupation with separation of powers 
and constitutional law. Yet the common law has never been simply about 
following precedent.4 Lawyers trained in the United States have to make their 
peace with the fact that this judicial lawmaking tradition is foundational to 
our legal system whether we believe unelected (and elected) judges are 
capable of doing so well or not. 
Many feminists have written off the common law because, as Bernstein 
acknowledges, it is slow moving and tends to be conservative.5 It does not 
yield the kind of dramatic outcomes and reversals of precedent that federal 
or state constitutional cases do. Nevertheless, at the heart of it, the common 
law protects vital negative liberties which prevent the state from intruding 
into the lives of women. A negative right merely prevents states from 
obstructing citizens from their pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. And 
these liberties, or as Bernstein puts it, “Do Not Wants,” are of critical 
importance to women.6 
I found compelling Bernstein’s description of the common law as a tool 
for feminist reform. Her argument that the common law gives women as 
much right to say no as men is important. However, there are weaknesses in 
the common law that make it less than ideal for feminist law reform. 
Bernstein acknowledges these and so the following observations are less 
criticisms of her work than they are attempts to focus in on some of the 
difficulties Bernstein raises in her book. 
In this Essay, I focus on three specific points. First, I examine the scope 
of the common law’s protection to underscore the point that this protection 
is not uniformly available. It is predicated on legal personhood and by 
 
 4 A number of scholars have written about judicial lawmaking. Some of the classics in the field are 
Wolfgang Friedman, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29 MOD. L. REV. 593 
(1966); Jack G. Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE WESTERN RES. L. Rev. 563 (1976); Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1 (1985); see also Arthur 
Eisenberg, Dear Brett Kavanaugh, Justices Do Make Law, AM. C.L. UNION (July 13, 2018, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/dear-brett-kavanaugh-justices-do-make-law 
[https://perma.cc/S36D-GW78]. 
 5 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1. 
 6 Id. at 75. 
Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative liberty to 
the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense. Positive liberty is the possibility 
of acting — or the fact of acting — in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s 
fundamental purposes. While negative liberty is usually attributed to individual agents, positive 
liberty is sometimes attributed to collectivities, or to individuals considered primarily as members 
of given collectivities.  
Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative [https://perma.cc/AZ9A-V6CK]. 
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bracketing that threshold requirement, many people, mostly minorities, are 
left without recourse to the law. Second, I take up the uses and limits of 
property as an analogy to women’s bodies. I argue that property law is far 
less helpful when the violator is the state as opposed to a private actor. 
Finally, I suggest that there are important linkages that require further 
inquiry. Economic changes and imperialism had indelible effects on the 
common law. Thus, a purely legal examination of the United States’ 
experience with the common law misses how capitalism and imperialism 
shaped its ideas about property, family, and personhood. 
I. THE SCOPE OF THE COMMON LAW’S PROTECTION 
First, there is the threshold question of whom the law protects. For 
much of history, the common law has acknowledged the existence of 
different kinds of legal persons (from the time of feudalism and serfs, 
villeins, and other bonded people to gender distinctions in the modern 
period).7 In order to make the case that the common law now protects 
women, we have to make the same accommodation that Bernstein makes 
regarding legal personhood—we have to bracket out much of common law 
history and confine ourselves to the last two centuries.8 As Bernstein tells us, 
judge-made law cannot confer legal statuses and the rights that attach. It can 
only vindicate the rights of those who already possess both.9 This means that 
we must look to statutory laws to confer this recognition on both men and 
women who have historically been excluded from the group of those who 
had rights.10 
The common law did not summarily exclude all women from 
protection. However, we know that it recognized an unequal status and 
maintained gender distinctions.11 For example, in the United States, enslaved 
people were entirely excluded, and the common law could not free them. 
Thus, who could avail themselves of the negative liberties historically 
 
 7 Legal Personhood denotes an entity that carries the legal rights and duties of a subject in the law. 
A legal person may not always be a “natural person.” For example, corporations are considered legal 
persons. In this Essay, I point out that even before a natural person may appear before the law to vindicate 
their rights, they must be “seen” as a legal person having rights and being able to do so. For an introduction 
to the concept, see Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Persons and Personhood, LEGAL THEORY 
BLOG (Dec. 31, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/12/legal-theory-lexicon-
persons-and-personhood.html [https://perma.cc/3JF2-KWR5]. 
 8 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 15–21. 
 9 Id. at 24–27. 
 10 Presumably, villeins, serfs, and other forms of bonded labor were not created by statute in the 
Middle Ages. Therefore, these statuses must arise from “something else” which forms the basis upon 
which the common law affords them recognition and legality. See id. 
 11 Id. at 24–28. 
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protected by the common law? Those who were already viewed as fully 
human, fully legal persons, even if gender made them unequal. 
The potential for equality exists only where legal persons do. 
Blackstone’s remarkable observation that “this spirit of liberty is so deeply 
implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave 
or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the 
laws, [] and with regard to all natural rights becomes eo instanti [from that 
instant] a freeman”12 was made true not by the common law but by the 
abolition of slavery through legislative act.13 In the United States, one might 
point out that not all Blacks were slaves. Did the common law protect with 
equal fervor the rights of free black men? At a time when freemen were 
constantly fearful of being enslaved regardless of their status, one would 
think not. 
Neither legislation nor the common law were able to fully protect the 
free status of African descended peoples. In other words, the common law 
judges were able to justify withholding the protections of the law from 
people who were legal persons by simply refusing to give credence to the 
evidence they were free. So, while being unable to confer legal personhood, 
they were willing and able to aid in depriving free Blacks of that status 
through contract and property law.14 
The inability of the common law to confer equal status is a serious 
weakness, and for feminists, this undermines the usefulness of the common 
law in substantively achieving the equality promised by formal laws. 
Legislative supremacy, therefore, obviously channels efforts at reform in that 
direction. Nevertheless, Bernstein’s point that the common law is not 
necessarily antagonistic to women’s rights does raise questions of 
possibilities and strategies that feminists would do well to consider.15 
 
 12 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 86 (Oxford 2016) (alteration in original). 
 13 The Act of 1807 abolished the slave trade in Great Britain. However, slavery continued in the 
colonies until 1833 and Britain continued to have ties to the trade for decades following the Act. See, e.g., 
MARIKA SHERWOOD, AFTER ABOLITION: BRITAIN AND THE SLAVE TRADE SINCE 1807 (2007). 
 14 See Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 105, 124–30 (Jean 
Allain ed., 2012). While Finkleman agrees with Bernstein that the common law cannot be read to condone 
or promote slavery, he also notes that it was used to give effect to contracts and property rights concerning 
slaves. Also, note the now widely known story of Solomon Northrup who was captured and enslaved for 
twelve years even though he was a free man. The story became the basis of the Oscar-winning film, 12 
Years a Slave, the title taken from Northrup’s autobiography written in 1853.  
 15 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1–2. Indeed, feminists would do well to use the argument made 
by Bernstein that now that women are considered formally equal, the common law’s protections once 
afforded to men are equally afforded to women. Thus, any argument based on tradition, which is so often 
relied on in substantive due process litigation, can be at least partially refuted as the gender unequal 
portion of tradition should no longer apply. 
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II. PROPERTY LAW AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
Bernstein’s reliance on property law in the argument that women have 
the right to exclude people from their bodies is both attractive and 
problematic. Its attractions are clearly articulated. To perhaps oversimplify 
her argument, she claims that if the common law acknowledges the right to 
exclude intruders from property with force, even deadly force, then surely 
such force is acceptable against any who intrude into the body of a self-
possessing woman.16 This argument is easily understood when it comes to 
repelling sexual assault, but is likely less palatable to some when applied to 
abortion. The body as property, the self-possessing individual, and the 
liberties that attach have long been subjects of philosophical and legal 
inquiry.17 The actions in defense of self and property that will be condoned 
depend on who is doing the boundary-crossing. 
Property and the law’s singular regard for it is not as firm a ground 
when the state is involved, as when the boundary crosser is a private actor.18 
We may tend to think otherwise because much of our constitutional law, 
when it comes to personal rights, is about negative liberties asserted against 
the state. For instance, historically, in common law-abiding England, there 
was very little by way of entirely “private property.”19 Land was held largely 
by the Crown (even now the state is the largest landowner). Fee simple 
absolute was rare. Americans largely abandoned the byzantine feudal 
property titles preferring outright ownership.20 But title is only as good as the 
state’s willingness to recognize it and uphold it. Moreover, as we have seen, 
even if the law theoretically regards property rights as sacred, the state 
crosses boundaries and invades it with some frequency. Feminists have had 
to draw careful lines around private property, demanding that the state 
protect women from violence even in the inner sanctum of the marital 
bedchamber.21 They have tried to both argue for privacy and also dismantle 
the public/private divide depending on context. For instance, the state has 
adopted some of these feminist arguments against privacy to prevent 
domestic violence and to ensure the wellbeing of children. And it has also 
 
 16 See id. at 115. 
 17 See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, OUR BODIES, WHOSE PROPERTY? 45–49, 135–137 (2013) (discussing 
Locke and Rousseau’s conception of property and individual rights to liberty and arguing that they did 
not consider women to be included in the category of rights holders). 
 18 See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 44–71 (1997). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See e.g., JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) (arguing that domestic violence law long advocated for by feminists has 
eroded privacy in the home, traditionally protected by the common law castle doctrine). 
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ignored feminist arguments for privacy to monitor the activities of those 
receiving state assistance.22 
The point here is that while one might be able to repel the intrusions of 
a private individual as a trespasser, one may not be able to repel the state. 
And increasingly, we are seeing intrusions into the bodies of individuals 
from transvaginal ultrasound legislation to the state’s ability to conduct 
cavity searches and to draw blood from those suspected of driving under the 
influence.23 Of course, these invasions are justified by (statutory) exceptions. 
Nevertheless, the number and scope of exceptions seem to be expanding to 
the point of whittling away the firm ground of the right to exclude. 
Rape is the easier case in the book. It is a criminal offense and the 
trespass by a private violator is easily recognizable as long as consent is 
absent.24 And consent is the terrain on which battles about rape law are being 
fought.25 But abortion and intrusions by the state are another matter entirely. 
III. HISTORICIZING THE COMMON LAW: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND 
EMPIRE AS INFLUENCES OF CHANGE 
On a different note, Bernstein’s book raised my curiosity about the 
effect of economic change on the development of the common law. Some of 
the changes in property law and many changes in the structure of the family 
coincide with the rise of capitalism and the advent of Liberalism.26 Enclosure 
and the changing of public land into private land, the rise of the “rights 
bearing” individual and social contract theory, and the formation of the 
private nuclear family with a status separate from the market/public perhaps 
coincide with the evolution of negative liberty. Further elaboration on how 
these rights evolved with the inclusion of the economic drivers would be of 
interest. 
Recent historical work on women slaveholders, for instance, suggests 
that coverture did not prevent married women from owning and managing 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 The most recent Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 U.S. 2525 (2019), upholds 
a Wisconsin law that holds an unconscious motorist has given tacit consent to blood drawing by the 
police, who can then ascertain if the driver is under the influence. It is of interest to note the assertion that 
someone who is unconscious has given consent is common in sexual assault cases. 
 24 Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 446 (2016). 
 25 Id.; see also Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual 
Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183 (2016). 
 26 I capitalize Liberalism here to denote the political and philosophical school of thought that 
emerged during the Enlightenment as opposed to the political distinctions made in U.S. electoral politics. 
See e.g., Liberalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism [https://perma.cc/E3ZC-EJLM]. 
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their own slaves without spousal interference.27 Married and single women 
managed and disciplined their slaves as private property, and actively 
participated in the slave trade.28 Families used trusts, prenuptial agreements, 
and other means to evade coverture even before the statutory enactment of 
married women’s property rights.29 Married women sued in chancery (even 
though in the United States, the distinction between law and equity has been 
blurred) for separation of property to make clear what property could not be 
reached by a husband’s creditors.30 
I raise this to suggest that it would be interesting to trace the 
development of the common law by taking into account the economic 
changes of the day and the ways in which some women’s lived experiences 
did not coincide with the legal constraints to which they were formally 
subject. Feminists have become increasingly interested in the economic 
dimensions of law reform, which suggests future historical work to be done 
in this area.31 
Relatedly, Bernstein starts her book with the intriguing statement that 
the “canvas is wider than one wide country.”32 Certainly, the history of the 
common law in England and the United States has relevance to other 
Commonwealth countries that share a legal heritage.33 This book, however, 
does not (and perhaps cannot) draw those linkages. But those linkages are 
important. For instance, Brenna Bhandar’s work on colonial property 
demonstrates that, in fact, changes in colonial property regimes were often 
imported back into Britain and changed the law.34 An example of this is 
formal titling of property, which was not required in England but became 
prevalent (sometimes dispossessing those who could not show ownership) 
after it was introduced in the colonies.35 Bhandar notes that common law 
property protections based on possession gave way to greater protection for 
 
 27 See generally STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS 
SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 29–30, 57–80 (2019). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies 
and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010) (examining 
the distinction between market and family and theorizing the “economic family”). For an early 
exploration of the link between market and family in U.S. legal scholarship, see Frances E. Olsen, The 
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
 32 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 2. 
 33 Commonwealth Countries: Commonwealth, INST. ADVANCED LEGAL STUD., 
https://libguides.ials.sas.ac.uk/commonwealth [https://perma.cc/Z9DP-HL69]. 
 34 BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF PROPERTY: LAW, LAND, AND RACIAL REGIMES OF 
OWNERSHIP 82 (2018). 
 35 Id. 
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formal title holders’ rights.36 Developments such as these have less to do with 
legal personhood or misreadings and misapplications of the law than they do 
with change driven by factors exogenous to the law.37 
Bhandar’s project is to excavate the co-construction of property laws 
and ownership and colonial/racial subjects. She asserts: 
Thus not only was property law the primary means of appropriating land and 
resources, but property ownership was central to the formation of the proper 
legal subject in the political sphere. Analyzing the techniques of ownership that 
remain a primary mode of dispossession in settler colonies cuts across the 
economic, cultural, political, and psychic sphere of colonial and postcolonial 
life. Modernity ushered in a relationship between ownership and subjectivity, 
wherein the latter was defined through and on the basis of one’s capacity to 
appropriate.38 
This observation is in line with Bernstein’s own project of showing how 
women came to be possessors and asserters of property rights through the 
expansion of recognition that they were legal persons. Bhandar’s further 
claim, expanding on Frantz Fanon’s theoretical work on (de)colonization, 
however, is that for racial minorities and colonial subjects, it is the very 
introduction of common law property that dispossesses them and, indeed, 
helps create the differential category.39 And here, taking together this insight 
and that of Jones-Rogers, we come to the problem of whether the common 
law is racist and sexist because of the way it has developed and the contexts 
in which it has developed. Or has it been, as Bernstein argues, simply 
misapplied and misinterpreted by judges enacting their own biases.40 If the 
latter, I worry that we fall into the Plessy trap in recognizing form over 
substance rather than something deeper and structural: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in 
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.41 
Or to paraphrase it: If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in 
the common law, but solely because judges choose to put that construction 
upon it. 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 4. 
 39 Id. at 5. 
 40 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 25–27. 
 41 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (emphasis added). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
168 
CONCLUSION 
Historicizing property law and the role of capitalism and Liberalism in 
its present formation helps to show that the direction of change in the 
common law, though slow moving, is not natural or predetermined. It is 
contingent on political and economic contexts and developments including 
the experience of slavery and colonialism. As such, the arguments that are 
available in the future may be shaped by other contextual changes—judges 
making judge-made law are, after all, people of their times. This is not a 
misreading of the common law as much as the inevitable result of its 
structure. One aspect of feminist theorizing then, is to imagine what these 
alternative futures might be. Bernstein’s work is important in 
unapologetically asserting what rights we have and in justifying and 
undergirding legal arguments to protect those rights. Her meticulously 
researched book should revive feminists’ interest in the common law as a 
basis for challenging the erosion of women’s liberties. As part of our legal 
history, the arguments presented in the book are valuable in contesting what 
many judges and anti-feminists consider long standing tradition. Bernstein 
powerfully shows that now that women are (legal) individuals, we can 
demand the same negative liberties that have been and continue to be integral 
to our society. And as women increasingly become part of the judiciary, we 
may also be so bold as to try and shape the future direction that judge-made 
law takes as well. 
 
